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D

espite wide-ranging efforts by governments in Europe
to address domestic violence, the problem continues
to exist at alarming levels. According to a 2006 report
issued by the Council of Europe, 20 to 25 percent of all women
in Europe have experienced physical violence at least once during their adult lives.1 In Turkey, that number is significantly
higher. Researchers have estimated that up to 40 percent of married women in Turkey have been abused by a partner or spouse.2
Even more disturbing is the widespread impunity enjoyed
throughout Europe by perpetrators of this violence.
A recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights
attacks domestic violence head on. On June 9, 2009, the Court
announced its judgment in Opuz v. Turkey,3 a case brought by a
victim of domestic violence against the Turkish government for
failing to protect her and her mother from attacks perpetrated
by her husband. Ruling for the plaintiff, the Court found that
the Turkish government violated three articles of the European
Convention on Human Rights:4 Article 2, the right to life; Article
3, the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment; and Article
14, the prohibition of discrimination. Critically, the Opuz decision holds governments accountable for failing to take adequate
steps to protect victims of repeated domestic violence, even
absent any active malfeasance on the state’s part. Additionally,
the decision marked the first time the Court recognized that the
failure of states to address gender-based domestic violence can
amount to a form of discrimination under the Convention.

because of lack of evidence.7 A month later H.O. drove his car
into Opuz and her mother, causing serious injuries.8 Following
repeated death threats from her husband, Opuz filed for divorce
and requested police protection.9 The local prosecutor filed
criminal charges, and H.O. was placed in detention. In October
1998, however, Opuz and her mother again withdrew their
complaints out of fear of retaliation. Due to the seriousness of
the alleged acts, the local court nevertheless convicted H.O. and
sentenced him to three months imprisonment. The sentence was
later reduced to a mere fine.10
In October 2001, H.O. stabbed Opuz seven times with a
knife during an argument. Shortly thereafter, Opuz’s mother’s
attorney petitioned the local prosecutor’s office, noting that
both Opuz and her mother had been previously compelled to
withdraw complaints against H.O. because of his continuous
death threats.11 Although the court issued a fine for the knife
assault, H.O.’s threats continued, and no further charges were
filed against him.12
The violence came to a climax when Opuz’s mother attempted
to move to another community in March 2002. H.O. confronted
Opuz’s mother, and in plain view of a witness, took out a gun
and shot the mother. She died instantly.13 H.O. was charged
with and convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison.14
The local court later lowered the sentence to 15 years in light of
H.O.’s good behavior during trial. Pending appeal, however, the
local court released H.O.15
In 2002, Opuz brought an application before the European
Court of Human Rights, alleging that the Turkish government
violated three articles of the Convention. First she argued that
the Turkish government violated Article 2,16 the right to life, and
Article 3,17 the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment, for
the murder of her mother and her own anguish and suffering,
respectively.18 While none of the domestic abuse was inflicted
under state supervision, Opuz asserted that the Turkish government violated the Convention by failing to protect her and her
mother, despite a known pattern of violent abuse and threats to
their lives.19 Additionally, Opuz argued that Turkey’s violations

A Cycle of Violence, A Failure to Act
Nahide Opuz married H.O. in 1995, and the couple settled
down in the southeastern Turkish city of Diyarbakır.5 Shortly
thereafter, H.O. began regularly abusing Opuz and members of
her family. In 1995, H.O. attacked Opuz and her mother, threatening to kill them both. Just one year later, H.O. severely beat
Opuz, causing bleeding in both her eye and ear. In each of these
instances, the local prosecutor filed criminal charges. The local
court, however, dismissed both cases after Opuz and her mother
withdrew their complaints out of fear for their safety.6 This
cycle of violence, followed by a failure of local authorities to
initiate criminal proceedings against H.O., was repeated numerous times over the next several years, with the attacks becoming
progressively more violent.
In February 1998, H.O. pulled a knife and attacked Opuz,
her mother, and her sister, incapacitating each for several days.
The local prosecutor decided not to file charges against H.O.
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of Article 2 and Article 3 also amounted to a violation of Article
14,20 the prohibition of discrimination. Opuz contended that the
local authorities’ lackadaisical attempts to safeguard her and her
mother reflected widespread gender discrimination in Turkish
legal institutions and Turkish society in general.21
In its defense, the Turkish government argued principally
that Opuz failed to exhaust domestic remedies prior to bringing her case to the Court,22 a requirement for admissibility.23
The Turkish government maintained that local authorities had
provided an immediate and tangible response to Opuz and her
mother, but that under the applicable domestic law, criminal
prosecution depended on complaints lodged or pursued by the
victim. Since Opuz and her mother consistently withdrew their
complaints, Turkey asserted that authorities were unable to go
forward with prosecuting H.O.24

Subsequent cases, including Bevacqua v. Bulgaria, confirmed this new line of reasoning.31 The plaintiff in Bevacqua
sought a divorce and custody of her child from her abusive husband. She alleged that Bulgaria failed to adequately protect her
from her husband or initiate proper legal proceedings with due
diligence.32 While again recognizing that the primary purpose of
Article 8 was to prevent undue state intrusion into private life,
the Court reasoned that respecting private and family life may
include “a duty to maintain and apply in practice an adequate
legal framework affording protection against acts of violence
by private individuals.”33 This positive duty arises particularly
for the safeguarding of vulnerable individuals.34 Because local
authorities had disregarded Bevacqua’s complaints, the Court
found Bulgaria in violation of Article 8 for failing to implement
these positive obligations.35
The Court went even further in Kontrová v. Slovakia36 by
delineating a specific standard articulating when governments
are obligated to intervene in private matters. In Kontrová, which
offers facts similar to those in Opuz, the plaintiff alleged that
she had suffered years of physical and emotional abuse by her
husband, including a beating with an electric cable that left her
unable to work for a week.37 Her husband later threatened to kill
himself and their children. Although Kontrová made a series of
visits and phone calls to local police regarding these threats, they
did little to intervene. Shortly thereafter her husband did in fact
shoot and kill their children and himself.38 Kontrová argued and
the Court found that Slovakia violated both Article 2 and Article
8, for failing to adequately intervene.39 Importantly, the Court
developed the following test detailing when a state must act to
protect an individual under Article 2:

From Privacy to Positive Obligations: Court
Precedent on Domestic Violence
European Court of Human Rights precedent addressing
domestic violence against women is scarce. While the Court has
adjudicated cases in which women have been the victim of state
violence,25 it has rarely addressed cases of domestic violence,
where the perpetrator is a non-state actor such as a spouse, partner, or other family member. Finding a state in violation of the
Convention in a domestic violence case requires a showing that
the government failed to adequately protect a plaintiff from the
actions of a private person.
Expecting a state to intervene to protect a private citizen
from another private citizen raises considerable policy concerns.
The state must know at what point it would need to intervene
in a domestic relationship, and whether such an intervention
amounts to excessive government interference in private affairs.
Indeed, Article 8 of the Convention, the right to respect for private and family life, states specifically that “[t]here shall be no
interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in
a democratic society in the interests of national security, public
safety or the economic well-being of the country.”26 In interpreting Article 8 obligations, both the Court and European governments have traditionally considered family life and relationships
between private individuals a matter beyond the purview of the
state.27
Nonetheless, the Court has developed a body of precedent
defining the point at which a government is responsible for
intervening in cases of violence or abuse within the private
sphere. It first addressed this problem in Airey v. Ireland,28 a
case in which a low-income woman could not hire an attorney
to represent her in divorce proceedings against her abusive husband. Airey argued that Article 8 imposed a positive obligation
upon the Irish government to provide access to legal proceedings
and services enabling her to seek a divorce. Siding with Airey
the Court noted that, although Article 8 generally protects private life from undue interference by governments, it may also at
times do the opposite and obligate governments to take affirmative steps to allow individuals the ability to enjoy their private
life.29 Airey’s personal right to enjoy respect for her private life
required an ability to divorce her abusive husband. Ireland’s
failure to make family law legal services available to Airey thus
violated Article 8.30

For a positive obligation to arise, it must be established
that the authorities knew of or ought to have known at
the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk
to the life of an identified individual from the criminal
acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged
reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that
risk.40
The Kontrová decision thus solidified a line of Court precedent that state authorities do in fact have positive obligations to
intervene within the private sphere in situations of clear and real
danger to specific individuals.

Three Violations of Human Rights
The Court’s decision in Opuz developed out of its precedent
in cases such as Bevacqua and Kontrová. Yet, the judgment went
further than many expected by clearly making prevention of violence against women in the domestic sphere a positive obligation
of the state, and the systematic failure to act on this obligation a
violation of the Convention’s prohibition of discrimination.
After rejecting the Turkish government’s argument that Opuz
failed to exhaust domestic remedies,41 the Court proceeded into
the merits of her case. Examining Opuz’s Article 2 allegation,
the Court first reiterated the test enunciated in Kontrová — that
Article 2 can impose a positive obligation on states to protect
life in the private sphere, but not in a way that would impose
an impossible burden on governments.42 That obligation exists
when authorities know or should know that a real and immedi30
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The decision recognizes that domestic violence against
women is a systemic problem reflecting a fundamental
imbalance of power. Although individual acts of violence
within the private sphere can be attributed to specific
persons, violence against women is generally perpetuated
through male domination of judicial and law enforcement
institutions. The Court’s judgment places a strong burden
on states to protect women from domestic violence.
3 violations by private citizens.48 Noting the history of abuse
and threats, as well as “the vulnerable situation of women in
south-east Turkey,”49 the Court held that Opuz’s abusive treatment rose to the level of torture or inhuman treatment, which
Article 3 was meant to prohibit.50 Given that local authorities
had remained relatively passive in their treatment of H.O., the
Court held that Turkey violated Article 3 by failing to adequately
protect Opuz.51
Finally, the Court turned to Opuz’s allegation that Turkey
violated Article 14 — the prohibition of discrimination — by not
adequately protecting her and her mother’s Article 2 and Article
3 rights. According to Court precedent,52 discrimination means
“treating differently, without an objective and reasonable justification, persons in relevantly similar situations,”53 and discrimination “may result from a de facto situation.”54 The Court also
looked to human rights norms in other jurisdictions to determine
how they treated violence against women. In doing so, the Court
examined the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, the Convention of Belém do
Pará, and statements by the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights and Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights.55 Based on both the European Convention and these
other international law instruments, the Court recognized that
“the State’s failure to protect women against domestic violence
breaches their right to equal protection of the law and that this
failure does not need to be intentional.”56
With these principles in mind, the Court examined whether
or not victims of domestic violence in southeastern Turkey
enjoyed equal protection of the law. Not surprisingly, the Court
found ample evidence of discrimination against women. Reports
examined by the Court from the Diyarbakır Bar Association, a
local non-governmental organization, and Amnesty International
documented numerous accounts of and statistics on domestic
violence in southeastern Turkey, along with failures of police
to properly investigate claims of abuse and unreasonable delays
in judicial proceedings.57 The Court found that this indifference

ate risk to life exists, and that their intervention between private
parties could reasonably prevent violence from occurring.43
In the specific context of domestic violence, the Court also
articulated additional factors that a government should consider
in determining when a state should intervene under Article 2
and Article 8, including, among others, the seriousness of the
alleged offense; whether or not a weapon was used; the amount
of threats and degree of planning behind the violence; the effects
of domestic violence on children living in the household; and
the previous history of the alleged perpetrator. Essentially, the
more serious the alleged domestic abuse, or the more likely it is
that serious abuse will continue, the greater the burden on local
authorities to properly intervene.44
The Court then specifically examined whether Turkey adequately fulfilled its Article 2 and Article 8 obligations by
reviewing both the legal and factual context pertaining to Opuz’s
situation. The applicable domestic law in Turkey’s criminal code
prevented authorities from independently prosecuting cases
without charges filed by a victim unless the alleged assault led
to ten days of illness and unfitness for work. For the Court this
standard was simply unrealistic, as it would fail to encompass
many cases of domestic violence.45 Given H.O.’s history of
threats and abuse, and the fact that Opuz and her mother had
notified local authorities about his behavior numerous times,
the Court stated that the authorities should have taken “special
measures consonant with the gravity of the situation.”46 Because
the authorities remained passive, despite persistent information
that should have compelled them to act aggressively against
H.O., the Court found the Turkish government violated Article 2
for the death of Opuz’s mother.47
The Court then examined Opuz’s allegation that H.O.’s abusive treatment of her and the local authorities’ subsequent failure
to act constituted a violation of Article 3 — the prohibition of
torture and inhuman treatment. Like its Article 2 analysis, the
Court reiterated the principle that states have a positive obligation in some situations to protect at-risk individuals from Article
31
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By Christian Koehn.

of torture and inhuman treatment. Lastly, Opuz states that the
failure to effectively protect women from domestic violence
can amount to a state’s violation of the Article 14 prohibition
of discrimination, even if unintentional. The Court’s decision
thus adequately equips victims of domestic violence with legal
recourse through the Convention to successfully pursue cases
against states for failing to protect them.
The Court’s judgment means that in order to fulfill Convention
obligations, European governments must aggressively pursue
criminal proceedings in cases of alleged domestic violence, and
such proceedings must be effective. Known patterns of continuous and serious abuse, in particular, should not be tolerated. To
this end, states should consider amending domestic violence
and criminal assault and battery laws to give prosecutors greater
discretion to pursue independent claims. These laws should also
provide for more aggressive measures for repeat offenders. Even
with new laws, prosecutors, judges, and police must redouble
efforts to identify dangerous situations and make effective interventions. This might require particular vigilance in situations
where victims are fearful of reporting abuse, a likely possibility
in domestic violence scenarios.
The Opuz decision has clear social implications as well.
Failure to adequately enforce Convention protections can arise
from discrimination embedded in social institutions and practices. A showing of systemic discrimination can be supported
by reports and statistics documenting a lack of sufficient law
enforcement activity to protect women from domestic violence.
Such indications of discrimination indicate a need for states to
make wider reforms across law enforcement generally, including
better human rights education and additional training of police
and prosecutors.

The town walls of Diyarbakır, Turkey.

and tolerance for domestic violence by local police and courts
was widespread throughout Turkey.58 Given Opuz’s specific
situation, and the overall failure of local authorities to protect
women from domestic violence, the Court held the Turkish government was in violation of Article 14 for not properly protecting her other Convention rights.59

A Landmark Decision for Women

Conclusion

The Court’s decision in Opuz is a landmark in the application
of the Convention to domestic violence. The decision recognizes
that domestic violence against women is a systemic problem
reflecting a fundamental imbalance of power. Although individual acts of violence within the private sphere can be attributed to
specific persons, violence against women is generally perpetuated through male domination of judicial and law enforcement
institutions.
The Court’s judgment places a strong burden on states to
protect women from domestic violence. A number of holdings in the Opuz judgment support this obligation. First, Opuz
clearly confirms that states have positive obligations to protect a
person’s Article 2, Article 3, and Article 8 rights when they are
threatened by the actions of other private actors. Second, Opuz
identifies when such positive obligations rise to the required levels of necessary action. Third, Opuz directly states that domestic
violence can amount to a violation the Article 3 prohibition

Reaction to the Court’s judgment has been overwhelmingly
positive, although somewhat cautious. Turkish human rights
activists have hailed the ruling as a significant step forward,
but recognize that on-the-ground enforcement by indifferent
local authorities will remain the key challenge.60 Indeed, Turkey
already has a long and unfortunate history of discrimination
and human rights violations against Kurds and other minorities,
and enforcement of the Court’s rulings on these issues has been
severely lacking. Still, this judgment has enormous potential
for women both in Turkey and throughout the continent. Maud
de Boer-Buquicchio, Deputy Secretary General of the Council
of Europe, noted that the Opuz decision could “make a difference for hundreds of thousands of women victims of domestic
violence in Europe.”61 It is up to the individual governments,
however, to protect the many women who, like Opuz, live daily
with domestic violence.		
HRB
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